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ABSTRACT  
   
Numerous published studies and a meta-analysis suggest that priming religion 
causes an increase in prosocial behaviors. However, mediating mechanisms of this 
purported causal relationship have not yet been formally tested. In line with cultural 
evolutionary theories and their supporting evidence, I test the proposition that public self-
awareness mediates the effect of priming religion on prosociality. However, other 
theories of religion suggest that persons may feel small when perceiving God, and these 
feelings have predicted prosociality in published research. In line with this, I also test 
whether a sense of small self and, relatedly, self-transcendent connection, are possible 
mediators of the religion priming effect on prosociality. In this study, I implicitly prime 
religion and test whether the above constructs mediate a potential effect on prosocial 
intentions. Although self-transcendent connection predicted prosocial intentions, the 
implicit prime affected neither the mediating variables nor prosocial intentions, nor were 
any significant indirect effects evident. Thus, no causal evidence of mediation was found. 
In addition, I examined whether God representations moderate the path from implicit 
religion priming to each proposed mediator. The results suggest that a benevolent God 
representation moderates the effect of religion priming on self-transcendent connection 
and that an ineffable God representation moderates the effect of religion priming on sense 
of small self. Lastly, I tested for mediation with a cross-sectional path model containing 
religiosity and belief in God as predictors. The results suggest that religiosity, controlling 
for belief in God, predicts prosociality through self-transcendent connection but belief in 
God, controlling for religiosity, does not predict prosociality. Implications for the religion 
priming literature and, more generally, the psychology of religion, are discussed.  
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CHAPTER 1 
BACKGROUND 
 Religion has long been credited as the source of human morality, which contains 
sanctions to not only refrain from hurting others but to actively engage in helping others. 
The Mosaic Law required ancient Jewish farmers to leave vegetation on the edges of their 
fields for the poor to harvest and eat (Levit. 23:22). Christianity is largely based on the 
example of Jesus, who helped the poor and unfortunate and instructed his followers to do 
the same (Matt. 15:29-39; Matt. 25:34-40). Anecdotal evidence that religion is 
responsible for prosocial behaviors in the modern age abounds. Several of the largest 
charity organizations were founded upon and continue to operate through religious 
principles. Several branches of Christianity encourage their youth to complete missions in 
developing nations with a focus on improving the lives of the unfortunate. Well-wishers 
on social media frequently use religious terms such as “blessing” and “prayer” to convey 
their positive feelings toward others. 
 How religion might move individuals to prosociality is a question of broad 
interest to society and is a potentially contentious topic for debate. On one hand, religious 
prosociality might spring from a self-focused feelings such as being watched by an 
observant and moralizing God or feeling small in the presence of greatness. On the other 
hand, religious thoughts might diminish one’s self-concern and shift awareness outward, 
causing an altruistic urge toward generosity. Furthermore, an individual’s God 
representation could affect not only the religious prosociality mechanism, but whether 
religion drives that person toward prosociality at all.  It is not hard to imagine that 
sensing a either a watchful, personal God or a nebulous, impersonal God would prime 
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two substantially different schemas, each with their own sets of expectations and 
obligations. 
If we are to accept any theory of religious prosociality, the implied intermediary 
mechanisms must be demonstrated to work, especially when we consider that each theory 
suggests unique causal mediators. Precise knowledge of how religion increases 
prosociality is also important not just because it fills a scientific knowledge gap, but 
because it has implications for our social ecology. Knowledge of the mind’s prosocial 
mechanism suggests a potentially universal key to enhanced cooperation that transcends 
the differences between religions and appeals to all. An understanding of the mechanism 
could result in finely tuned religious or secular messages that precisely stimulate the 
desire to think prosocially.  
In the present research, two competing theories of religious prosociality are 
briefly summarized and then mediating mechanisms are proposed for each. These two 
theories alternatively support the separate notions of either self-concerned prosociality or 
other-concerned generosity in religious contexts. In support of self-concerned giving, the 
supernatural punishment hypothesis would predict that public self-awareness mediates 
religious prosociality. In support of other-concerned giving, positive emotions theory 
would predict that self-transcendent emotion, in this case a sense of vast connection or a 
sense of small self, respectively, mediate religious prosociality.  
The Religion-Prosociality Connection 
 There is abundant scientific evidence correlating religious membership with 
prosocial values such as virtue, altruism, and helping (Lam, 2002; Loveland, Sikkink, 
Myers, & Radcliff, 2005; Myers, 2012; Oviedo, 2016; Regnerus, Smith, & Sikkink, 
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1998; Ruiter & De Graff, 2006; Saroglou, Pichon, Trompette, Verschueren, & Dernelle, 
2005; Saroglou, 2013). Quasi-experimental research has also demonstrated similar 
effects. For example, Ahmed (2009) found that Muslim theology students, compared to 
Muslim secularist students, gave more money to others in both the Dictator Game and the 
Public Goods Game. This study compared naturally occurring groups that differed on a 
concrete religious commitment signal, which importantly addressed the shortcomings 
inherent to self-report, such as self-delusion or lying (Saroglou et al., 2005). Projective 
measures and peer-reports of religiosity have also been found to predict prosociality 
(Saroglou et al., 2005). Overall, researchers across multiple disciplines have tended to 
posit that religion is the foundation of modern prosocial morality (Graham & Haidt, 
2010; Norenzayan et al., 2016; Spilka, Hood, Hunsberger, & Gorsuch, 2009; Wilson, 
2002). Various scientific methods implemented by many researchers among diverse 
populations have provided extensive evidence of religion’s effects on prosociality. 
 Priming. The recent advent of religious priming has enabled a body of 
experimental studies that, overall, supports the notion that religious thoughts lead to 
prosociality (Oviedo, 2016; Shariff, Willard, Andersen, & Norenzayan, 2016; see Galen, 
2012 for a critique). Priming occurs when exposure to a given stimulus activates a given 
schema, which is then demonstrated to be active by effects on a downstream variable 
(Bargh & Williams, 2006). Often, priming is done outside the participants’ awareness to 
avoid the problems of hypothesis guessing and demand characteristics. Subliminal primes 
such as flashed words, implicit primes such as religion-infused sentence completion 
tasks, and contextual primes such as administering a survey in the presence of a religious 
building have demonstrated positive, arguably causal, effects on prosocial measures. This 
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body of work provides empirical evidence that religious thoughts can spur individuals to 
prosocial behavior. 
 Mediating mechanisms. The idea that religious cognition can increase 
prosociality leads naturally to wondering how such an effect might work. Is religiously 
motivated generosity mediated by concern for self or concern for the beneficiaries? Do 
religious givers act so as to reflect their God or appease their God? Although their 
scientific and societal implications abound, religious prosociality mechanisms have 
scarcely been studied. Hardy and Carlo (2005) found that religious prosociality among an 
adolescent sample was mediated by kindness. In a study of people having just attended a 
church service, Van Cappellen, Saroglou, and Toth-Gauthier (2016) found that love 
mediated religious prosociality. However, neither of these studies were true experiments, 
so causality claims are not entirely tenable. Though statistically controlling for many 
sources of variance can increase the plausibility of a causal relationship, even the most 
careful covariate selection is limited by theory and resources, so systematic relationships 
between outside varaibles and the dependent variable are bound to affect the researcher’s 
findings. We can be reasonably sure that religion is responsible for much of the 
downstream variance, but we cannot claim that the effects are purely from religion. An 
experimental study, like that in the present research, can address how religious cognition 
itself affects prosociality by randomly assigning participants and theoretically equalizing 
all confounding variabels among the test groups. Further, the aforementioned mediation 
studies did not directly test current cultural evolution theories regarding the roots of 
religious prosociality and thus did not address important metatheoretical connections. 
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The current research tests for mediation by the variable predicted by cultural evolutionary 
theory. 
Increased Self-Concern 
The general premise of evolutionary religious psychology is that religion 
solidified the social construction by preventing actions harmful to the group’s cohesion 
(Sosis & Alcorta, 2003). The idea that a concerned God was watching human actions 
from above and keeping a record of all acts good and bad controlled human behavior in 
an all-encompassing way that would have otherwise been impossible. Secret behaviors 
were now thought to be observed, perceived consequences of cheating behaviors 
increased, and therefore the cooperation to defection ratio increased.  
 Assuming that this watchful God framework is the basis of contemporary 
attitudes toward God, we might expect that reminders of God encourage prosocial 
behavior by introducing the thought of being watched.  The Supernatural Monitoring 
Hypothesis forwarded by Norenzayan and colleagues (2016) posits that belief in a 
moralizing, observing God, along with costly signals and group rituals, served to control 
behavior by enforcing conformity to group norms, which almost always include acting 
benevolently toward other members of the group. Inherent to this hypothesis is a belief in 
an observing God, the reminders of whom would necessarily include the sense of being 
watched. Gervais and Norenzayan (2012) demonstrated that thoughts of God lead to 
feeling watched by implicitly priming participants with thoughts of God and then 
measuring situational self-awareness. Participants who had completed sentences that 
included religious words reported feeling more self-conscious and concerned with self-
presentation. In a follow-up experiment, participants who were primed with the same 
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religious words engaged in more socially desirable responding, which indicates 
predisposition to prosocial behavior. 
 The feeling of being watched is strongly related to prosocial behavior. The 
presence of others inspires humans to manage their self-presentation so as to optimize 
their appearance to others (Leary & Kowalski, 1990; Schlenker, 1980). One way humans 
engage in impression management is by publically conforming to behavioral norms, 
among these prosocial behavior (van Bommel, van Prooijen, Elffers, & van Lange, 2014; 
Van Vugt, Roberts, & Hardy, 2007; Nettle et al., 2013). Given our current psychology 
and the historical record, humans likely evolved in an environment rich with social 
monitoring and came to adeptly look for norm violations in others and self (Bering & 
Johnson, 2005; Chudek & Henrich, 2011; Chudek, Zhao, & Henrich, 2013). Humans are 
attuned to social expectations, especially when under public observation (Fehr & 
Fischbacher, 2003; Markus, 1978). Indeed, humans frequently assume that their 
behaviors are being monitored (Gilovich, Medvec, & Savitsky, 2000) and are sensitive to 
even subtle cues that inform social monitoring (Chudek & Henrich, 2011; Fehr, 
Fischbacher, & Gächter, 2002). These subtle cues can increase compliance to norms that 
include fairness and prosociality (Haley & Fessler, 2005; Nettle et al., 2013; Rigdon, 
Ishii, Watabe, & Kitayama, 2009; van Bommel et al., 2014; Van Vugt et al., 2007; 
Zhong, Bohns, & Gino, 2010), especially among those who are chronically self-aware 
(Pfattheicher & Keller, 2015). Arguably, because reminders of God increase public self-
awareness (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012), persistent belief in a moralizing, observing 
God might create chronic self-awareness and this would increase norm compliance 
among believers in God.  
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 Increased public self-awareness would reasonably increase concern for reputation 
and therefore one’s desire to be observed acting in prosocial ways. Reputation has been 
cited as crucial for the development and viability of indirect reciprocal systems, where 
the exchanges are not always directly reciprocal (Fu, Hauert, Nowak, & Wang, 2008; 
Nowak, 2006; Nowak, Page, & Sigmund, 2000). Reputations act as a kind of credit rating 
in these indirect reciprocal networks, where exchanges are more complex than a well -
monitored tit for tat between two mutually familiar actors. In a system of reciprocity 
among strangers, reputation is a crucial social heuristic which has been shown to be at 
least partially based on prosocial tendencies (Keltner, Van Kleef, Chen, & Kraus, 2008). 
Nowak and Sigmund (1998) ran computer simulations demonstrating that cooperation is 
a viable evolutionary strategy precisely because of reputation. The energy and resources 
invested in reputation-building repay the investor by increasing future receipt of 
cooperation from others. Further experiments in which players were more likely to 
engage with a person having a good reputation for cooperation supported this hypothesis 
(Milinski, Semmann, Bakker, & Krambeck, 2001; Milinski, Semmann, & Krambeck, 
2002; Wedekind & Milinski, 2000). These benefits earned by reputation and status can 
act as strong motivation to act prosocially in spite of immediate costs and non-immediate 
material benefit (e.g., Milinski et al., 2002). In support of this notion, Hardy and Van 
Vugt (2006) found that group members who act prosocially are afforded greater status, 
while other work has shown that humans grant higher status to generous givers (Willer, 
2009). Given that reminders of God increase public self-awareness (Gervais & 
Norenzayan, 2012), the effect of public self-awareness on reputational concern, the 
benefits to the collective afforded by reputational concern, and the importance of large 
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cooperative networks to the Big Gods hypothesis, the effect of God reminders on 
prosociality should be mediated by a sense of surveillance. In sum, reminders of an 
observing, moralizing God should increase public self-awareness of either supernatural or 
human surveillance, which should lead to increased displays of prosocial behavior. 
Reminders of God may motivate prosocial behavior by increasing public self-awareness 
and thus concern for the self. 
Small Self. Although the small self mesurement used in the present research was 
intended as a measurement of decreased self-concern, our factor analysis led to a single-
item measure (I feel small or insignificant) which is ambiguous regarding self-concern. It 
would be reasonable for this sentiment to mean that one is self-consciously aware of 
feeling small or that one’s normal self-concern is dwarfed by an expansive perception. 
Therefore, small self is included as a possible mediator of self-concerned and self-
transcendent religious prosociality. 
Decreased Self-Concern 
 Reminders of God might increase prosociality by reducing self-concern. Though 
the deity might have the same Big God characteristics, including watching and 
moralizing, believers might attend more to the vastness of God than the omniscience or 
omnipotence, which potentially would lead to prosociality through a different mechanism 
than perceived surveillance. Alternatively, the perception of divine qualities such as love 
or benevolence, whether expressed through God or devout followers, may be activated by 
God reminders. Finally, a believer may hold entirely non-anthropomorphic God 
representations such that they believe in a limitless cosmic force that is often thought of 
as beyond human understanding. Thoughts of a God such as this would, theoretically, 
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distract one’s attention away from self and direct it outward in direct opposition to the 
notion of increased public self-awareness. This reasoning leads us to now consider awe. 
Awe. In his classic lecture, The Reality of the Unseen, William James quoted one 
believer’s statement that, when contemplating God, “awe mingled with a delicious 
restfulness most nearly describes my feelings” (1985). Awe is often central to purported 
encounters with the divine, several of which were factored into Keltner and Haidt’s 
(2003) conceptual analysis of this emotion. These researchers ultimately defined awe as 
the emotion resulting from perception of stimuli so vast as to require effortful 
accomodation. Religious experience is one elicitor of this emotion (Keltner & Haidt, 
2003; Shiota, Keltner, & Mossman, 2007). Given that people commonly endorse words 
such as limitless, omnipotent, eternal, infinite, and cosmic to describe God (Johnson, 
2016), awe induced by the thought of God is theoretically plausible. Though awe 
generally is generally a positive reaction to positive stimuli, (Keltner & Haidt, 2003; 
Shiota et al., 2007), negative stimuli may induce awe just as well. Piff and colleagues 
(2015) elicited awe by displaying threatening nature stimuli, which suggests that awe 
might partially explain a prosociality increase among certain believers in a watchful, 
authoritarian God. Given that nearly all descriptions of God include descriptors of 
incomprehensible vastness, reminders of God could induce a sense of awe. Alternatively, 
the implicit religion prime may remind people of their religion itself, independent of a 
diety. Religion frequently involves not only a large network of fellow believers, but a 
deep historical precedent. Reminders of one’s religion might induce awe by a sense of 
populational and/or temporal vastness. 
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 An established pathway between awe and prosocial behavior is the second leg of 
this mediational hypothesis. Awe appears to induce identitification with a larger construct 
than the self, which is beneficial for putting group needs over one’s immediate personal 
needs. People high in dispositional awe are more likely to describe themselves as part of 
a collective than with individualistic terms, as were participants exposed to awe-inducing 
stimuli (Shiota et al., 2007). Participants exposed to an awe-inducing video score higher 
on the Inclusion of Other in Self Scale (Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992), suggesting more 
closeness with others (Van Cappellen & Saroglou, 2012). 
 Small Self. Awe seems to increase prosociality by inducing a sense of small self. 
Campos and colleagues (2013) found that memories of awe-inducing experiences caused 
participants to feel smaller in relation to their environment. In another study, memories of 
awe increased feelings of being part of something larger than self, decreased occupation 
with small daily events, and increased feelings of smallness and insignificance (Shiota et 
al., 2007). Other studies have linked diminished self with prosocial tendencies and 
behavior (Boer & Fischer, 2013; Campbell, Bonacci, Shelton, Exline, & Bushman, 2004; 
Caprara, Alessandri, & Eisenberg, 2012; McCullough, Emmons, & Tsang, 2002). Closer 
to this study’s religious theme, Krause and Hayward (2015) found that awe of God 
predicts more connectedness with and belongingness to one’s congregation. Further, 
mulitple studies have documented the connection between the experience of nature—a 
powerful elicitor of awe (e.g., Davis & Gatersleben, 2013; Griskevicius, Shiota, & 
Neufeld, 2010; Shiota et al., 2007)—and prosocial behavior. Generosity increases among 
participants placed in rooms with plants, as opposed to rooms without plants (Weinstein, 
Przybylski, & Ryan, 2009) and participants exposed to natural beauty may exhibit more 
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prosociality (Cohen, Gruber, & Keltner, 2010; Zhang, Piff, Iyer, Koleva, & Keltner, 
2014). 
 Building on existing research, Piff et al. (2015) hypothesized that awe increases 
prosociality and that this effect is mediated by feelings of small self. They found that 
inductions of awe increased ethical decision making, generosity, and prosocial values, 
while those higher in dispositional awe exhibited more prosocial behavior as measured by 
an economic game. Feelings of small self partially mediated these relationships. These 
feelings of small self are important as diminished self-awareness and increased 
commitment to the group could be just as crucial for cooperation as increased self-
awareness. Nature favors a defector unless there is pressure to cooperate, so the basic 
instinct of humans is to focus on self first until such time that cooperation is in self-
interest. The predicted end result of either strategy is increased cooperation, so either 
could mediate the effect of religion on prosociality. These opposite strategies for 
achieving fitness related goals are incompatible in that individuals cannot effectively 
entertain both simultaneously. Given their separate natures, self-awareness and self-
transcendence, if they explain any variance in religious prosociality, likely explain two 
uncorrelated sources of variance. The feeling of being watched, which would increase 
generosity by focusing attention on reputational concerns (Keltner, Kogan, Piff, & 
Saturn, 2014; Nowak, 2006; Sober & Wilson, 1998), would be an unlikely mediator of 
prosociality among the self-transcendent.  
Self-Transcendence. Awe and small self both might be labeled self-transcendent 
emotions. Awe results from a powerful stimulus temporarily exceeding the scope of 
one’s conceptual framework and the subsequent need to accommodate the new 
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information. In this moment of awe, the self may be temporarily shrunken relative to 
bigger concerns, causing a person to transcend their normal attentional limits. However, 
the self-transcendence construct (Cloninger, Svrakic, & Przybeck, 1993) also contains an 
element of connection to a larger being or collective, so the small self measurement 
would not necessarily capture the entire mediation of awe’s effects on prosociality.  
Recent research has supported this notion by demonstrating that awe leads to self-
transcendence (Johnson et al., 2017) and that self-transcendence mediates the relationship 
between self-reported religiosity and prosocial intentions (Scott, in preparation). Given 
my focus on self-perception as a mediator of religious prosociality and the time 
constraints of the experimental priming effect, the specific self-trancendence element—
connection to something larger—is proposed as a mediating variable.  
The Effect of God Representations 
 Religious literature has abounded with numerous representations of God and 
personal beliefs that, within even the same religion, might be vastly different. Muslims 
may believe in a vengeful or benevolent version of Allah. Jews traditionally endorse a 
God who watches all with a keen eye for punishable transgressions but also seeks to 
protect his chosen people; modern Jews often feel free to believe in a non-
anthropomorphized God or even none at all (Silverman, Johnson, & Cohen, 2016). 
Christians choose their God representations from both the Old and New Testaments, 
which include the authoritarian or benevolent Yahweh, the anti-establishment or 
compassionate Jesus, and traditionally a triune godhead which includes Father, Son, and 
Holy Spirit, each of whom posesses mulitiple different qualities. God representations 
come in a large range of permutations, each associated with different emotions and traits 
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in the believer (Johnson, Okun, & Cohen, 2015), and therefore these representations 
should affect different cognitive and behavioral responses. 
 Johnson, Okun, and Cohen (2015) have forwarded a set of distinct God 
representations that predict significant and differential cognitive variance, indicating that 
the way individuals perceive God has a unique affect on their thoughts and, presumably, 
actions. Participants who describe God with terms such as wrathful and controlling think 
of God as authoritarian. Terms such as compassionate and tolerant describe a benevolent 
representation. Terms such as transcendent and vast describe a mystical representation. 
So far as they think of God in different ways, individuals should be differently motivated 
by thoughts of God. Johnson et al. (2015) found that benvevolent, but not authoritarian, 
God representations predict agreeableness and conscientiousness. Authoritarian God 
belief predicted higher endorsement of the social power value and lower endorsement of 
the benevolence value. An individual who perceives a wrathful, controlling God is likely 
to feel watched and intent on making a good impression. If this cognitive suite could lead 
to prosociality, it would likely be through self-conscious means such as public self-
awareness. On the other hand, thoughts of a mystical God who transcends human 
cognition are likely to induce rapturous awe, resulting in a diminished self or a 
connection to something greater than the normal self. All of these proposed divine 
cognition effects have been shown to increase prosocial behavior and therefore are 
plausible mediational mechanisms in religious prosociality.  
 
  14 
CHAPTER 2 
PRESENT RESEARCH AND HYPOTHESES 
 The present research aims to discover the underlying mechanism(s) of religious 
prosociality. However, equally plausible competing theories necessitate the entertainment 
of several hypotheses.  
H1: Public self-awareness mediates the effect of religious priming on prosocial behavior. 
H2: Small self mediates the effect of religious priming on prosocial behavior. 
H3: Self-transcendent connection mediates the effect of religious priming on prosocial 
behavior. 
 Another aim of the research is to ascertain whether individual God representations 
link to different mediational mechanisms. To test this, exploratory analyses of whether 
each representation moderates the A path for each mediator were performed. The 
literature and previous data sets indicate divergent outcomes for God representations 
(e.g., a benevolent God makes people less prosocial because they think all is forgiven), so 
hypotheses are tentative, but some are justified by the literature. First, I hypothesize that 
authoritarian God representations will postively moderate the path from religion prime to 
public self-awareness, since this sort of God is the basis of the supernatural punishment 
hypothesis. Second, I hypothesize that a mystical God representation will positively 
moderate the path from religious prime to self-transcendent connection, since this sort of 
God predicts awe and self-transcendence (Johnson et al., in press; Scott, in preparation). 
 




 I conducted a two-condition between-subjects experiment in order to test 
mediated causal paths. The independent variable was implicit religious priming. The 
mediating variables were sense of small self, public self-awareness, and a selection of 
self-transcendence items inferring connection to something bigger. The dependent 
variable was the number of hours committed to volunteer work in the month following 
the experiment. 
Participants 
 The sample was drawn from a pool of Arizona State University undergraduates 
who would complete the study for course credit. An a priori analysis to estimate the 
sample size needed for .8 power to detect each indirect effect with 1000 bootstrapped 
samples was conducted based on available published and pilot test effect sizes. Each 
effect size for each pathway (α for xm; β for my) was categorized according to a 
rubric from a highly cited paper (Fritz & MacKinnon, 2007), then the sample size for 
each mediated effect (αβ) was taken from the recommendations in the same Fritz and 
Mackinnon (2007) paper. Both α and β symbolized the standardized regression 
coefficients for their respective paths, but this statistic was not reported in any of the 
referenced publications, so the reported Pearson’s r was used because this statistic is 
equal to a standardized regression coefficient.  
 The estimate for the God prime to public self-awareness path (Gervais & 
Norenzayan, 2012; r = .36) and the estimate for the public self-awareness to prosocial 
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intention (to give up time helping the community in the next two weeks) path (pilot data; 
r = .07) indicated a required sample size of 404 to detect a public self-awareness 
mediated effect. Combined with an assumed small priming effect (α), the self-
transcendence items to prosocial intention path estimate (pilot data; r = .23) suggested a 
sample size of 412. Also combined with an assumed small priming effect (α), the 
estimate for the small self to prosociality pathway (Piff et al., 2015; r = .30) suggested a 
sample size of 412.  
Based on the weakest hypothesized pathway and the suggestions from Fritz and 
MacKinnon (2007), I decided on a sample of 412 participants. Data collection went 
beyond 412 participants in order to avoid cancelling existing appointments and to 
compensate for potentially discarded participants. I obtained an initial sample of 446 
complete survey responses. Participant inclusion, a priori, was based on correctly 
answering all of three attention check questions, spending at least seven minutes on the 
survey, and constructing passable sentences in the priming task. Based on an inspection 
of the data, I also removed participants whose responses included long strings of identical 
answers when such would be inappropriate, such as across two scales of different 
constructs. All of the above participants were deemed to have failed attention checks. 
Though several participants failed on multiple dimensions, each participant is counted 
once by the failure that was discovered first. In the end, 42 participants were removed for 
attention check failures, 16 were removed for poor sentence construction, and one was 
removed for completing the survey too quickly. Two participants were removed post hoc 
because of uninterpretable dependent variable responses. At this point, blank responses 
on the observed variables were coded as missing. 
  17 
Following removal of untrustworthy data, I turned my attention to statistical 
outliers that would exert undue influence on the regression equations. Due to the 
unbounded open-response volunteering variable, there was a chance that some extremely 
high values would exert extremely high influence on the outlier threshold itself, so I 
calculated the raw mean and standard deviation and then inspected cases which were 
more than four standard deviations from the mean (> 96.02 hours). Two cases (300 hours 
and 120 hours) were removed before the ensuing outlier check.  
The analysis of regression outliers requires all of the predictor variables, some of 
which relied on factor analysis to be finalized. With the two most egregious outliers 
removed, I inspected the factor structure for the public self-awareness and self-
transcendent connection scales, which were identical to that from the future smaller 
sample, so all of the mediating variables and the priming condition were included as 
predictors in this outlier search. Studentized deleted residuals are the indicator of choice 
for identifying regression outliers (Cohen et al., 2003), by which the residual error for the 
Y observation, as predicted by all of the independent variables simultaneously, is 
calculated with that particular case deleted. Nine cases with a studentized deleted residual 
greater than |3| were deleted. 
 The final sample included 374 participants (M age = 19.22, SD = 2.44, 160 Male, 
213 Female) representing diverse religious beliefs (55 Atheist, 52 Agnostic, 176 
Christian, 11 Jewish, 12 Muslim, 34 Spiritual but not religious, 34 Other) who completed 
the study in exchange for psychology course credit. Though this sample was smaller than 
originally intended, the power estimates were based on 1000 bootstrapped resamples, 
whereas the current analysis would use 5000 bootstrapped resamples, which should result 
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in smaller estimated confidence intervals. An effect size with a smaller confidence 
interval is less likely to contain zero, so I estimated that the additional bootstrapped 
samples would add virtual power to detect indirect effects and thus compensate for the 
deleted participants. There is, however, no guarantee of added power because additional 
bootstrapped samples do not necessarily shrink the confidence intervals. 
Procedure 
 Participants completed the survey in a non-descript psychology lab on individual 
desktop computers separated by partitions. After consenting to participate, they 
completed the God representations scale. In order to erase any inadvertent religion 
priming effects, the students completed a short personality measure and a longer socially 
desirable responding scale. After these measures, I administered the priming 
manipulation, followed immediately by the three randomized mediational variable 
measurements. After the main measurements described above, the students completed 
some exploratory measures and demographic questions, after which they received a 
funneled debriefing and gratitude for their time.  
Materials 
Independent variable. I used the same ten-item sentence completion task found 
in Shariff and Norenzayan’s (2007) well-cited religious priming paper. Participants were 
presented with 10 individual five-word strings, each of which were to be rearranged to 
form a coherent four-word sentence. For instance, “sky seamless blue is the” should be 
rearranged to form the sentence, “The sky is blue.” Word strings in the control condition 
contained no religious words, but half of the word strings in the priming condition did 
  19 
contain one religious word. Participants in the priming condition were implicitly exposed 
to religious words and thus should not have realized that they were primed. 
Mediating variables. I administered three short scales immediately following the 
priming manipulation and immediately preceding the ultimate dependent variable. Each 
item was centered at zero in order to provide meaningful regression intercepts such that 
zero indicated neutrality on a given item. Participants responded to a pooled and 
randomized complete set of items from all scales. I then calculated a mean item score for 
each participant on each scale. Reliability coefficients reflect the Cronbach’s alpha 
measured among the current sample. 
Small self. A short scale from Piff et al. (2015) was intended to assess feelings of 
a small self. The items were I feel small or insignificant, I feel the presence of something 
greater than myself, I feel part of some greater entity, and I feel like I am in the presence 
of something grand. Responses were given on a Likert scale of -3 (strongly disagree) to 3 
(strongly agree). An initial reliability test revealed low alpha (.63), so I conducted an 
unrotated principal axis factoring to check the latent variable structure. One major factor 
emerged, but the last three items hung together with factor loadings of .829, .806, and 
.874, respectively, while the flagship item, “I feel small or insignificant,” had a factor 
loading of -.117. Based on this analysis, I chose this single non-loading item as the 
complete Small Self measure because it is the only item that directly assesses the precise 
construct that the title indicates. The other three items connoted the idea of connection 
with or perception of something greater, which is not the feeling of small self per se, and 
so did seem to mesh with the self-transcendence items. For that reason, these items were 
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ultimately folded into the self-transcendent connection measure following a factor 
analysis. 
Public Self-Awareness. The three public-oriented items of the Situational Self-
Awareness Scale (Govern & Marsch, 2001), which served as Gervais and Norenzayan’s 
(2011) dependent variable, measured immediate levels of perceived surveillance and self-
awareness (α = .83). The three items were “Right now, I am concerned about the way I 
present myself”, “Right now, I am self-conscious about the way I look”, and “Right now, 
I am concerned about what other people think of me.” Responses were given on a Likert 
scale of -3 (strongly disagree) to 3 (strongly agree). 
Self-Transcendent Connection. I initially selected ten items from the 
Temperament and Character Inventory Self-Transcendence subscale (Cloninger, Svrakic, 
& Przybeck, 1993) and adapted them from their original trait-measuring form to assess 
immediate levels of self-transcendence vis-à-vis perception of large, non-self phenomena. 
Item examples include “I have a clear, deep feeling of oneness with all that exists” and “I 
feel so connected to nature that everything seems to be part of one living organism.” I 
included three items from the Piff et al. (2015) small self measure because they 
comprised a single factor quite different from the precise small self item and because the 
items describe perception of a larger reality (see measure above). I conducted an 
unrotated principal axis factoring of the 13 items in order to check the factor structure of 
this new item assembly. The three imported items showed impressive fit with the other 
items with loadings on the primary factor all above .600. However, five of the original 
self-transcendence items (see Appendix) loaded onto the scale poorly. After removing 
these items, another factor analysis on the eight remaining items revealed that they all 
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loaded strongly onto a primary factor we might label self-transcendent connection 
(eigenvalue = 4.06). A second factor (eigenvalue = 1.41) also emerged, but it provided 
little predictive value, had weak loadings, and defied reasonable substantive 
interpretation. The final bigger connection measure contained five original items and the 
three formerly “small self” items. All of these were selected because their factor loadings 
were .6 or above. Reliability of the final measure was acceptable (α = .86). Responses 
were given on a Likert scale of -3 (strongly disagree) to 3 (strongly agree). Inter-item 
correlations are displayed in Table 4. 
Dependent variable. Participants were then presented a hyperlink through which 
they could navigate to a local university volunteering website. I asked them to peruse the 
possible volunteering opportunities and then report back with the charity that most 
interested them, then to manually enter how many hours they could commit to 
volunteering for that organization over the next two weeks. Open-ended response entry 
entailed significant data cleaning since the answers, overall, were somewhat unwieldy. 
Range entries were changed to the mean of that range, uninterpretable answers were 
entered as missing, and ambiguous answers (e.g., “a few hours per week”) were 
interpreted as the minimum possible value in that range (e.g. two). Means and standard 
deviations may be viewed in Table 1. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
 All analyses were based on the coding scheme (0=Control, 1=Primed). Levene’s 
Tests revealed that variances were equal among experiment groups for all of the 
dependent variables (all ps > .300). The two groups did not differ significantly on the 
God representation pre-test (all ps > .40); most importantly, the level of non-belief in God 
was not statistically different (p > .20) between the two groups (Table 2). Means and 
standard deviations for all measured variables may be viewed in Table 3. An initial 
analysis of experimental group differences in committed volunteer time, without any 
mediating variables, revealed that the God prime did not significantly affect the 
participants’ stated amount of volunteer time, β = .538, SE = .975, d = .064, p = .582. 
Given the possibility of indirect effects even when no direct effect is present (Rucker et 
al., 2011; see also Hayes, 2018), I report the proposed mediational analyses below. 
Single-Mediator Models  
In order to investigate whether each proposed mediating variable mediates the 
relation between religion priming and volunteering, single-mediator path models were 
tested using Mplus Version 8 (Muthen & Muthen, 1998-2017). Indirect effect confidence 
intervals were estimated with standard errors from 10000 bias-corrected bootstrapped 
samples. All results reflect unstandardized regression coefficients. 
Small self. The priming manipulation (Figure 1) did not predict feelings of small 
self (b = -.216, SE = .182, 95% CI [-.589, .109], ns) and small self did not predict 
volunteering (b = .347, SE = .269, 95% CI [-.183, .861], ns). Unsurprisingly, the 
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confidence interval for the indirect effect (b = -.075, SE = .100, 95% CI [-.365, .016], ns) 
included zero.  
Public self-awareness. Participants who had been primed (Figure 2) endorsed 
somewhat lower levels of public self-awareness (b = -.182, SE = .163, 95% CI [-.498, 
.138], ns), which trended opposite from the published findings. In turn, public self-
awareness had a non-significant negative effect on volunteerism (b = -.224, SE = .293, 
95% CI [-.801, .328], ns). The indirect effect was not different from zero (b = .041, SE = 
.079, 95% CI [-.048, .323], ns). 
Self-transcendent connection. The priming manipulation (Figure 3) did not 
predict higher self-transcendence (b = .075, SE = .120, 95% CI [-.156, .312], ns), but self-
transcendence did predict more time volunteered (b = .890, SE = .359, 95% CI [.223, 
1.634], p = .013). The indirect effect, however, did not reach significance (b = .067, SE = 
.118, 95% CI [-.116, .376], ns). 
Full Model  
Including all of the mediators in a path model commonly leads to different 
regression coefficients due to statistically controlling for other included effects. With this 
in mind, I ran a model with individual paths from the priming manipulation to each 
mediating variable and from each mediating variable to the volunteering measurement 
(Figure 4). Two significant paths emerged: That from self-transcendence to volunteering 
(b = 1.007, SE = .358, 95% CI [.335, 1.752], p = .005) and from small self to 
volunteering (b = .629, SE = .273, 95% CI [.092, 1.167], p = .021). The total indirect 
effect was negligible (b = .029, SE = .183, 95% CI [-.340, .395], ns) and no specific 
indirect effects approached significance (all ps > .32) 
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Exploratory Analyses 
Prosocial intentions scale. The open-response volunteer pledge responses were 
non-normally distributed, Skewness = 2.134 (SE = .138), Kurtosis = 7.202 (SE = .276), 
K-S (311) = .184, p < .001, and plagued by a 16.8% missing data rate. In order to test a 
perhaps cleaner measure of a similar dependent variable, I assessed prosocial intentions 
over the next two weeks with a six-item scale (see appendix), which included offering 
money to a charity, donating clothes or goods to a charity, doing volunteer work for a 
charity, going out of one’s way to help a friend in need, giving up one’s time to do 
something for the community, and going out of one’s way to help a stranger in need. This 
scale was administered after the open-response item, so results should be interpreted 
cautiously (see Discussion). Like the open-response item, this variable failed the 
normality test (K-S (374) = .086, p < .001), but the skewness and kurtosis values were 
both less than |1| and the distribution appeared normal, albeit with some minor lowest 
score inflation. A principal axis factor analysis revealed one factor (eigenvalue = 2.79) 
which explained 46.48% of the scale variance. Reliability of this measure was marginally 
acceptable (α = .77). I repeated the mediation tests described in the previous section. 
An initial analysis revealed that the God prime did not significantly affect the 
participants’ scale responses, b= .081, SE = .071, d = .117, p = .258. Again, given the 
possibility of indirect effects even when no direct effect is present (Rucker et al., 2011; 
see also Preacher & Hayes, 2018), I report the mediational analyses below.  
Self-transcendent connection. As with the open-response item, self-transcendent 
connection predicted two-week prosocial intentions (b = .237, SE = .118, 95% CI [.176, 
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.299], p < .001). There was no significant indirect effect of self-transcendent connection 
(b = .013, SE = .028, 95% CI [-0.041, .070, ns). 
Small self. The small self item response did predict lower two-week prosocial 
intentions (b = -.059, SE = .024, 95% CI [-.106, -.012], p =.012). There was no 
significant indirect effect of small self (b = .007, SE = .011, 95% CI [-.009, .036], ns). 
Public self-awareness. Public self-awareness had no significant association with 
two-week prosocial intentions (b = .011, SE = .025, 95% CI [-.039, .061], ns). There was 
no indirect effect of public self-awareness (b = -.001, SE = .005, 95% CI [-.002, .005], 
ns). 
Full model. As with the open-response dependent variable, I ran a model with 
individual paths from the priming manipulation to each mediating variable and from each 
mediating variable to the two-week prosociality intention measure (Figure 5). Once 
again, two significant paths emerged. Self-transcendent connection predicted higher 
intended prosociality (b = .229, SE = .031, 95% CI [.170, .290], p < .001) and small self 
predicted lower intended prosociality (b = -.051, SE = .023, 95% CI [-.096, -.004], p = 
.030). Public self-awareness approached significant prediction of higher intended 
prosociality (b = .042, SE = .024, 95% CI [-.005, .089], p = .076). The total indirect effect 
was negligible (b = .020, SE = .031, 95% CI [-.039, .085], ns) and no specific indirect 
effects approached significance (all ps > .32). 
Interaction of the prime and religion. In Gervais and Norenzayan (2012), the 
implicit God prime affected the public self-awareness of high believers and low believers 
differently in one study, but not in the other. I explored the possibility that religiosity and 
strength of God belief, respectively, moderated the effect of the prime on the modeled 
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variables. Religiosity was measured with a six-item religiosity scale (Cohen, Malka, 
Rozin, & Cherfas, 2006; α = .93; see appendix). God belief was measured with a reversed 
item (I do not believe God exists). Both item responses ranged a scale from -3 (strongly 
disagree) to +3 (strongly agree).  
Open-response time pledge. All mediators and the time variable were regressed 
on priming group, religiosity, belief, Priming Group x Religiosity, and Priming Group x 
Belief. With this model, religiosity predicted higher self-transcendent connection (b = 
.322, SE = .070, 95% CI [.173, .455], p < .001) and the God prime predicted lower small 
self endorsement (b = -.435, SE = .219, 95% CI [-.857, -.008], p = .047). Interestingly, 
the interaction of religiosity and priming approached significant prediction of small self 
(b= -.259, SE = .152, 95% CI [-.567, .028], p = .088) and of public self-awareness (b = -
.261, SE = .024, 95% CI [-.539, .004], p = .058). The main effect of priming and these 
interaction coefficients are negative, meaning that priming decreased both public self-
awareness and small self and that religiosity interacted with the priming to downregulate 
these mechanisms even more. This directly contradicted Gervais and Norenzayan (2012) 
and thus ran contrary to my hypotheses. Obliquely supporting Hypothesis 3, there was a 
significant indirect effect of religiosity on the time pledge through self-transcendent 
connection (b = .256, SE = .119, bootstrapped 95% CI [.067, .541], p = .031). 
Prosocial intentions scale. All mediators and the two-week prosocial intentions 
measurement were regressed on priming group, religiosity, belief, Priming Group x 
Religiosity, and Priming Group x Belief. With this model, religiosity still predicted 
higher self-transcendent connection (b = .254, SE = .050, 95% CI [.148, .349], p < .001), 
which in turn predicted prosocial intentions (b = .192, SE = .033, 95%CI [.129, .257], p < 
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.001). Small self predicted lower prosocial intentions (b = .045, SE = .023, 95% CI [-
.090, .001], p = .048). There was a significant indirect effect of religiosity through self-
transcendent connection (b = .049, SE = .013, 95% CI [.026, .079], p < .001). No other 
noteworthy effects were found. 
Log-transformation. The hours pledged data were zero-inflated and displayed a 
strong positive skew. While the bootstrapping techniques of the main analyses rested on 
no distributional assumptions, I wondered whether normal data would alter the results. As 
a strong test of the hypothesis that normal data would change the results, I transformed 
the data (log10) and removed the zero hours cases. The resulting distribution still failed 
the normality test, K-S (243) = .108, p < .001, but the skewness (.039, SE = .156) and 
kurtosis (-.121, SE = .311) were relatively small and the distribution visually 
approximated something like a bell curve. The simultaneous full mediation model was 
then applied to this transformed dependent variable. Self-transcendent connection 
predicted the log10 of hours pledged (b = .037, SE = .014, 95% CI [.010, .063], p = .007). 
No other significant effects emerged, demonstrating that the dearth of indirect effects in 
the other models was likely not a function of the data non-normality. 
Moderated A path. Different representations of God should prime different 
psychological states. For instance, picturing an authoritarian, wrathful God might induce 
feelings of self-consciousness whereas picturing a benevolent, forgiving God might 
induce feelings of self-transcendence. Different God representations may predict different 
pathways from divine contemplation to prosociality. With this in mind, I explored the 
possibility of moderated mediation for each combination of single God representation 
and single mediator. The model included main effects of each of the five God 
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representations, a main effect of experimental group, and interactions of the group and 
respective God representations (see Figure 6 for the general “Moderated A Path” 
diagram). Further, I looked for indirect effects from a given Group x God Representation 
interaction through the included mediators to the dependent variable using 10,000 bias-
corrected bootstrapped samples. There were effects of benevolent God representation (b 
= .218, SE = .162, 95% CI [.041, .392], p = .013), mystical God representation (b = .267, 
SE = .092, 95% CI [.107, .465], p = .004), and ineffable God representation (b = -.158, 
SE = .064, 95% CI [-.283, -.034], p = .013) on self-transcendent connection. The 
interaction of priming and benevolent God representation predicted lower levels of self-
transcendent connection (b = -.249, SE = .125, 95% CI [-.499, -.011], p = .046). Ineffable 
God representation predicted higher feelings of small self (b = .382, SE = .100, 95% CI 
[.187, .574], p < .001). The interaction of priming and mystical God representation 
predicted less public self-awareness (b = -.465, SE = .188, 95% CI [-.827, -.098], p = 
.014). No significant indirect effects were present. 
 I repeated this analysis with the prosocial intentions scale as the dependent 
variable. A marginal indirect negative effect of the Prime x Benevolent God 
representation on prosocial intentions through self-transcendent connection emerged (b = 
-.057, SE = .030, 95% CI [-.122, -.004], p = .059). It is worth mentioning that this same 
negative indirect effect emerged with the time pledge dependent variable, but the p-value 
was .101.  
 Moderated mediation. While moderation of the A path suggests a form of 
moderated mediation, a more stringent test is whether moderating variables significantly 
change the indirect effect itself. I tested whether the indirect effects of the prime on 
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pledged volunteer time—through small self, public self-awareness, and self-transcendent 
connection—were moderated by a given God representation. Coding such a test in MPlus 
was prohibitively difficult, but the SPSS PROCESS module made such a test possible 
(Hayes, 2018). The downside here was that PROCESS does not approach missing values 
with FIML, so the moderated mediation tests were performed on the volunteer time 
dependent variable with its 16.8% missing data rate. However, since FIML uses existing 
variables to predict the missing values, I reasonably expected that the SPSS-obtained 
coefficients would not differ too much from the ones that Mplus would have provided. 
 The results of the moderated mediation analyses are found in Table 5. All 
confidence intervals were calculated from 5,000 bootstrapped samples. The “Prime x 
Moderator” column set contains the unstandardized regression coefficient and confidence 
interval for the effect of each Prime x God Representation interaction on a given mediator 
variable, quantifying whether a given XM pathway is moderated by a given God 
representation. The Mod.Med column set contains the unstandardized regression 
coefficient and confidence interval for the independent relationship of each God 
representation and mediator. Though this statistic does not directly predict moderated 
mediation, it does shed light on potentially interesting cross-sectional relationships. The 
final column set, Mod. Med, displays the moderated mediation index and confidence 
intervals. The moderated mediation index is the slope of the line representing the change 
in the indirect effect (mediation) as the moderator variable changes. This slope is equal to 
the change in the indirect effect for each additional unit of the moderator variable (Hayes, 
2018, p.455). If the confidence interval for this line does not include zero, we may 
conclude that the indirect effect of the mediator changes in response to the moderator 
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and, thus, moderated mediation exists. This analysis revealed no evidence that any 
indirect effects were moderated by God representations. 
Cross-sectional mediation. The implicit prime failure effectively negated the 
possibility of finding experiment-driven results, but the dataset did contain sufficient 
measures to analyze cross-sectional variables for mediation of religious prosociality. 
These variables also allow for the parsing of whether religiosity or belief in God, 
controlling one another, predict prosociality. Preston and Ritter (2011) found that religion 
is associated with religious ingroup giving and God cognition relates to religious 
outgroup giving, so there is reason to predict differences in prosocial intentions. Given 
the association of self-transcendent connection and prosocial intentions in the current 
dataset, along with previous cross-sectional work in support of this hypothesis, I 
predicted that self-transcendent connection would mediate the association of religiosity 
and prosocial intentions. I included a measure of belief in God to parse religiosity from 
belief in the divine, but expected that both predict prosociality and that self-transcendent 
connection would explain the associations. 
 I ran two structural equation models. Both had the previously used religiosity and 
belief in God measures as predictors, the hypothesized three mediators, and either 
pledged volunteer time (Figure 7) or two-week prosocial intentions (Figure 8) as the 
dependent variable. I will use the accepted terms direct effect and indirect effect, but 
these do not imply causation in these cross-sectional analyses. In the two-week prosocial 
intentions model, the only significant A path was from religiosity to self-transcendent 
connection, b = .285 [.189, .372], SE = .047, p < .001, controlling for divine belief. In 
terms of B paths, small self predicted lower prosocial intentions, b = -.047 [-.091, -.002], 
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SE = .023, p = .039, and self-transcendent connection predicted higher prosocial 
intentions, b = .190 [.128, .254], SE = .033, p < .001. One significant indirect effect—
from religiosity (controlling for divine belief) to self-transcendent connection to prosocial 
intentions—emerged (b = .054, SE = .013, bootstrapped 95% CI [.032, .083], p < .001). 
Controlling for one another, there was a direct effect of religiosity b = .086 [.028, .143], 
SE = .029, p < .01, but not of divine belief (p = .497), on prosocial intentions. In the 
volunteer time pledged model, a similar pattern emerged, though small self predicted 
more hours pledged (b = .604 [.039, 1.162], SE = .282, p = .032), in spite of having 
predicted lower two-week intentions in the previous model. In line with the last model, 
self-transcendent connection predicted more time pledged (b = .972 [.202, 1.823], SE = 
.411, p = .018), and the indirect effect from religiosity, controlling for divine belief, was 
significant (b = .277, SE = .127, bootstrapped 95% CI [.064, .574], p = .029). There was 
no direct effect of religiosity or divine belief on number of hours pledged (ps > .48), 
though that particular dependent variable had several problems. 
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION 
 Overall, I found no experiment-based support for mediation of religious 
prosociality by the tested variables: small self, self-transcendent connection, and public 
self-awareness. The results indicate that self-transcendent connection predicts prosocial 
intentions, but the religious prime did not positively affect this mediator or the dependent 
variable, which points to a possible problem with the experimental manipulation. The 
most obvious reason for this manipulation failure is that I administered the God 
representations measurement to all participants early in the study, with the goal of saving 
resources by completing the study in one session. The implicit prime is a relatively subtle 
manipulation that exposes participants to a five separate, singular religious words 
embedded in sentences that have no direct religious connotations. If this subtle 
manipulation can prime religion, then asking participants to make 27 (including the non-
belief items) responses by thinking about God, which requires conscious and deliberate 
cognition, could easily mask the effect. All participants may have been strongly primed 
with God — and therefore religion due to the high correlation — rendering the subtle 
downstream implicit prime of little manipulative value. The strong likelihood of this 
event suggests that the current research should not be brought to bear on whether implicit 
religion priming affects prosociality or whether it even works overall. This experiment 
was not a true replication of previous methods by which participants were primed having 
not seen any other religious stimuli. In fact, participants had to think extensively about 
God, which was probably a stronger religion schema prime than the intended 
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manipulation, so no conclusions about how this work fits into the priming literature, other 
than as a cautionary tale, are appropriate. 
 Priming woes aside, the findings contradict existing theory and experimental 
work that suggest public self-awareness as a mediator of religious prosociality. The 
supernatural punishment hypothesis, which suggests that humans cooperate because they 
sense that a judgmental God—who demands prosociality—is watching their thoughts and 
behavior, has been partially supported by published experiments showing that priming 
religion makes people feel more public self-consciousness, which we might conceive as a 
feeling of being watched. Although the current research cannot address the veracity of the 
above finding due to a design flaw, it can address whether public self-consciousness 
increases prosociality and whether it mediates the relationship between prosociality and 
religion. The suggestion from this and previous work (Scott, Cohen, & Johnson, 2017) is 
a resounding “no” because both studies revealed a non-significant, but negative, 
correlation between public self-consciousness and prosocial behavior and intentions. 
Furthermore, I have unpublished data documenting that the implicit prime used in the 
current work, but without an unfortunate design flaw, non-significantly decreased public 
self-awareness (Scott, 2016). Although the Supernatural Punishment Hypothesis and Big 
Gods Theory powerfully suggest that public self-awareness should mediate religious 
prosociality, I see no convincing evidence. 
 However, the failure to demonstrate that public self-awareness mediates religious 
prosociality does not necessarily contradict the Supernatural Punishment Hypothesis or 
Big Gods Theory because these ideas have been forwarded as descriptions of our 
evolutionary past that explain current behavior. According to the Big Gods Theory, the 
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idea of a watchful and judging God increased cooperation among certain groups, which 
increased group and individual fitness, resulting in the natural selection of genes that 
worked well in such a culture and thus our current propensity to be good at thinking 
religiously. Whether current humans feel compelled to prosociality now because they feel 
watched by God bears little on the theory because there is no need for ancient God 
concepts to match current God concepts. It is entirely possible that humans conceived 
God(s) as compelling prosociality through punishment in the ancient past, setting the 
cultural evolution precedent that led to modern religion and prosociality, but perceive 
much kinder and gentler God(s) now. Given the speed and totality with which cultural 
evolution shapes our psychology (Henrich, 2015), it may be unfair to test an anthro-
psychological theory with modern participants who possess religious concepts radically 
different from their ancestors. Even if we prime certain facets of God (e.g., authoritarian), 
can we be sure that the activated schema matches that of the ancients, who were 
entrenched in a different and vastly less scientific culture that interacted with God(s) in 
probably unreproducible ways? The point of this argument is not to disparage current 
efforts to understand our evolved religious concepts, but to indicate that failure to 
confirm a Big Gods hypothesis with a modern human sample does not necessarily falsify 
it. Perhaps better testing is to be found among non-Western, pre-industrial cultures who 
share religious and cultural concepts with ancestral humans. It could be that WEIRD 
samples (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010) do not conceive of the same punishing 
and watchful God as those who were first moved to prosocial behaviors centuries ago. 
This could be seen as a boon or a deal breaker, or neither, for the testing of Big Gods 
hypotheses. Given the importance of the knowledge we seek and that the current 
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paradigm is the best one we have, I favor continued experimentation and theorizing with 
a view toward overcoming the temporal and cultural generalization obstacles. 
 Self-transcendent connection predicted prosocial intentions, and it seems like 
thinking about God or religion should increase it, so we might hypothesize that this 
construct mediates religious prosociality. The evidence I currently have is mixed as to 
whether that is the case. In the current work, the prime did not affect self-transcendent 
connection and in past experiments the same prime non-significantly decreased self-
transcendent connection, so we have no experiment-derived evidence that religion or 
divine belief causes self-transcendent connection. However, this thesis’ exploratory 
cross-sectional analysis suggests that religiosity predicts self-transcendent connection and 
prosocial intentions, but belief in God, controlling for religiosity, does not. This means 
that the religion/God prime, like that used in numerous studies including the current one, 
might exert its most powerful effects on the religious, for whom the prime activates the 
associated thoughts of a communal religion along with those of God. Unfortunately, the 
current study design prevents me from testing this hypothesis in spite of having measured 
all of the pertinent variables, but previous research has shown that religiosity predicts 
higher volunteering and spirituality predicts lower volunteering (Okun et al., 2014). 
 It is important to note that these findings do not necessarily contradict previous 
work that detailed relationships between belief in God and prosociality, they merely call 
attention to the need for granularity. For instance, Preston and Ritter (2013) found that 
people associate God cognition with outgroup giving, and people primed with the word 
“God” donated more to the religious outgroup than to the religious ingroup. However, the 
mean donation for each experimental group, collapsed across ingroup and outgroup, was 
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not reported, so we do not know whether priming God or priming religion causes more 
generosity. Furthermore, priming the word “religion” among a sample with individual 
differences in divine belief and religiosity is not the same as measuring religiosity as an 
independent variable. The word “religion” can prime any number of vastly divergent 
schemas ranging in effect from repulsive to enchanting. As an extreme example, this 
prime among a sample of militant atheists would likely manipulate uncomfortable anti -
religious sentiments. The same prime among a group of faithful religion devotees would 
elicit warm prosociality, at least toward religious ingroup members. Though it does not 
assess causality, the religiosity measurement runs along a continuum from zero to high 
positive religious association, so it does not capture variance in anti-religiosity and thus is 
more capable of quantifying religion-based prosociality. After all, the population of 
interest to these studies is the religious or at least theistic crowd, not atheists, so perhaps 
confining ourselves to religious believers is wise. 
That religiosity, but not pure belief in God, might predict prosociality has some 
notable implications for psychology beyond the small circle of affected experimentalists 
and for society at large. The study of the psychology of religion could benefit from this 
delineation in designing future research questions and re-examining filed data, though the 
scope of this topic is too broad for the current thesis. Similarly, given the current exodus 
of Westerners from organized religion, and toward independent forms of spirituality, 
perhaps individual members of society would benefit from taking pause before making 
the generalized assumption that organized religion is an inferior form of spirituality. 
Perhaps the mass rejection of organized religion in all its forms is a case of “throwing the 
baby out with the bath water” in terms of maintaining a cooperative society. Obviously, 
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some are leaving religion for ethical reasons based on perceived social crimes of the 
church leadership, but concluding that all religion is bad and an isolated relationship with 
God is better based on the misbehavior of some may be premature. One need not believe 
in a supernatural realm to become more prosocial by organized means, either. If 
religiosity, but not belief in God, predicts prosociality, then perhaps it is devoted 
membership in a pro-prosocial group that is driving the effect of religion on prosociality.  
 Also notable is that a benevolent God representation interacted with the prime to 
reduce self-transcendent connection, which is surprising but does mesh with recent 
research by Debono and colleagues (2017), who found that priming a benevolent God 
increased unethical behavior (decreased prosociality). The current work suggests that 
Debono et al.’s effect was at least partially mediated by decreased self-transcendent 
connection. This relationship between a benevolent God and lowered self-transcendent 
connection is interesting because, at least on the surface, it appears one should be inspired 
to charity and human connection in the presence of a loving and giving God. The 
available evidence suggests that perhaps the perceived generosity of God exerts a self-
focusing effect on the perceiver, who thinks about all the blessings he can get and all the 
sins he can commit before receiving guaranteed forgiveness. Such a finding would surely 
raise some hackles among researchers and worshippers alike, but such is the pursuit of 
truth.  
Limitations 
 The measurement of belief in God for the exploratory studies was a single, 
reverse-coded item, while the religiosity measure was a reliable six-item scale. The belief 
measure may have been unreliable for these reasons and because it may only measure 
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belief in “God” as opposed to something like “God, a universal spirit, or a divine power.” 
It is possible that participants believing in the latter construct could not strongly endorse 
the former construct, so the measure did not capture all of the divine belief in the sample. 
I may have insufficiently measured the latent variable, “belief in God,” and thus pitting it 
against a more reliable measure of religiosity may have been unfair. 
 Generalization of the current findings should perhaps be limited to undergraduates 
who attend a public American university. More importantly, the findings should not 
automatically be applied to actual prosocial behavior, since the dependent variable was 
prosocial intentions as reported online to an unfamiliar researcher. Whether one should 
expect higher or lower prosocial intentions by different means of inquiry, and that they 
would correlate strongly with prosocial behavior, is debatable. Likely, most prosocial 
behavior occurs in one’s normal, interactive, physical timespace with familiar others, so 
what we measure online with imperfect scales might not reflect the intended construct.  
Future Directions 
 The time is ripe for testing whether membership in a religion creates prosociality 
over and above what a secular prosocial group might create. Such work could really start 
to parse whether religion is indeed a special kind of force for good or if it can be matched 
by other, less controversial motivations. Galen (2012) argued that religion does not cause 
prosociality because its effects can be explained by impression formation, stereotyping, 
and ingroup favoritism, so it does not differ from secular social groupings and thus 
religion is not responsible for prosocial motivations. Saroglou (2012), commenting on 
Galen (2012), responded that this mediation by mundane means does not invalidate the 
causal effect of religion because inquiry into the mechanisms by which different stimuli 
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exert their effects is the focus of psychological research. For example, if we found that 
seeing a great work of art and climbing the Swiss Alps both induced prosociality through 
a sense of awe, we should not conclude that they are indistinguishable, nor that one is 
more important than the other. It is not clear whether more tests will ever settle this 
debate for those on the extremes of this topical spectrum, but they probably should be 
performed. 
Pursuit of the interaction of God primes and religiosity appears to be an important 
avenue of future research. Past research has explored whether belief in God (e.g., Gervais 
& Norenzayan, 2012; Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007) affected the impact of the implicit 
sentence completion prime, but the results have been mixed, so we cannot say for sure 
whether belief in God affects the prime’s impact. I myself have seen this prime affect 
non-members of religion significantly more than members of a religion (Scott, 2016), so 
we cannot say whether religious membership, by itself, changes the priming effect. 
Perhaps religiosity—the fervor with which one endorses personal involvement with a 
religion—is the best predictor of the religious priming effect if religiosity is the construct 
moving self-transcendent connection and prosociality. This hypothesis is justified by the 
finding that religiosity, controlling for belief in God, predicts prosocial intentions but 
belief in God, controlling for religiosity, does not. The religious prime, or even a God 
prime, might only increase prosociality among those for whom the manipulation primes a 
schema that includes other people and proscription to give charitably to others. This idea 
dovetails with the unpredictable relationship of belief in God with the prime (some 
believers are religious and some are not) and with the similar unpredictable relationship 
with religion membership (some members are fervent and others are not). Religiosity 
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captures variance in both membership itself and intensity of attachment to the religious 
belief system which usually involves proscriptions toward prosocial behavior. 
 In this future research, care must be taken in measuring religious concepts for a 
study that involves sensitive and subtle implicit priming techniques. There is no cut and 
dried answer to the dilemma regarding when to measure these associated constructs. One 
solution is to measure religiosity several days in advance of the priming study, but this 
ignores the possibility that self-reported religiosity varies from day to day. A participant’s 
religiosity on the day of the experiment might not match that from previous 
measurement. Measuring at a time near the experiment helps with this problem, but 
introduces two new possibilities. If religiosity is measured closely preceding the 
experiment, it may pre-prime the control group. If it is measured closely proceeding the 
experiment, the manipulation could be affecting the religiosity measurement. From the 
available evidence, which includes the notions that implicit primes are both sensitive and 
short-lived, while explicit measures might have strong priming effects that last longer, it 
might be best to measure religiosity as long as possible after the priming manipulation 
and the dependent variable within the experimental session. In support of this, the 
manipulation is priming whatever stimuli-related schema the participant brings to the 
study, so the religiosity variable, inasmuch as it would moderate the priming effect, is 
linked substantively to the priming manipulation, so the priming manipulation should not 
affect the religiosity profile. 
Conclusions 
 The evidence presented here suggests that we can rule out public self-awareness 
and small self as mediators of religious prosociality. Self-transcendent connection bore a 
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consistently strong positive relationship with prosociality and with religiosity, so this 
work suggests it as a potential mediator of the religion priming effect on prosociality. 
Further, when controlling for one another, religiosity, but not belief in God, predicted 
prosociality and this relationship was mediated by self-transcendent connection. The 
implication here is that embeddedness in a religious group drives prosocial behavior. 
That belief in God, controlling for religiosity, does not predict prosociality is not to say 
that there is no relationship between the two constructs, but that the relationship may be 
complex. All together, these findings suggest that researchers need to increase the 
granularity of religious and spiritual prosociality research and that current theories of 
these relationships merit continued careful testing. Though the path is long and winding, 
we are moving toward a better understanding of religious prosociality. 
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LAMBI Scale (God Representations) 
Using a wide range of the scale below, please rate how well each word describes you 
conception of God, the divine, or a higher power. (strongly disagree, disagree, somewhat 
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Public Self-Awareness 
Please respond to each statement based on how you feel RIGHT NOW, AT THIS 
INSTANT—not how you feel in general, or at this point in your life. There are no “right” 
or “wrong” answers—just be honest. (strongly disagree, disagree, somewhat disagree, 
neither agree nor disagree, somewhat agree, agree, strongly agree). 
I am concerned about the way I present myself. 
I am self-conscious about the way I look. 
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Self-Transcendent Connection (adapted from the TCI Self-Transcendence Scale and 
the Small Self Scale) 
Please respond to each statement based on how you feel RIGHT NOW, AT THIS 
INSTANT—not how you feel in general, or at this point in your life. There are no “right” 
or “wrong” answers—just be honest (strongly disagree, disagree, somewhat disagree, 
neither agree nor disagree, somewhat agree, agree, strongly agree). 
I feel a clear, deep feeling of oneness with all that exists 
I feel so connected to nature that everything seems to be part of one living organism.  
I feel like I am part of something with no limits or boundaries in time and space 
I feel a strong sense of unity with all the things around me 
I feel so connected to the people around me that it is like there is no separation between 
us 
I feel the presence of something greater than myself* 
I feel part of some greater entity* 
I feel like I am in the presence of something grand* 
I would do things to protect animals and plants from harm or extinction** 
I would gladly risk my own life to make the world a better place** 
I am feeling a “sixth sense” that allows me to know what is going to happen** 
I would make real personal sacrifices to make the world a better place, like trying to 
prevent war, poverty, and injustice** 
I am experiencing unexpected flashes of insight or understanding** 
*Items originally from small self scale        **Discarded items 
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Small Self  
Please respond to each statement based on how you feel RIGHT NOW, AT THIS 
INSTANT—not how you feel in general, or at this point in your life. There are no “right” 
or “wrong” answers—just be honest. (strongly disagree, disagree, somewhat disagree, 
neither agree nor disagree, somewhat agree, agree, strongly agree) 
I feel small or insignificant 
I feel the presence of something greater than myself* 
I feel part of some greater entity* 
I feel like I am in the presence of something grand* 
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Religiosity Scale 
To what extent do the following statements describe your religion and spirituality? 
(strongly disagree, disagree, somewhat disagree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat 
agree, agree, strongly agree) 
I am a religious person. 
I am a spiritual person. 
I believe in the teachings of my faith tradition. 
My religion and spirituality is an important part of my identity. 
If someone wanted to understand me as a person, my faith would be very important for  
that. 
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Descriptive Statistics of the Major Study Variables 
 
Group  n*  Dependent Variable Mean (SD)  
    Small Self Self Aware Connect Pledge Intent 
Control  188  -.04 (1.81) .41 (1.53) -.35 (1.16) 8.18 (7.51) .26 (.68) 
Primed  186  -.26 (1.67) .23 (1.60) -.27 (1.16) 8.72 (9.62) .34 (.70) 
Note: Scale of all measurements except Hours Pledged (Pledge)  is -3 (strongly disagree) to +3 
(strongly agree); 
*n for Hours Pledged: Control = 155, Primed = 156. 
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Table 2.       
       
God Representation Means (SD) 
 
  Group   
Representation  Control  Primed  Total 
Authoritarian  -.11 (1.24)  -.18 (1.22)  -.14 (1.23) 
Benevolent  1.09 (1.40)  1.20 (1.48)  1.15 (1.44) 
Mystical  .84 (1.22)  .73 (1.33)  .79 (1.28) 
Limitless  1.16 (1.36)  1.10 (1.42)  1.13 (1.39) 
Ineffable  .10 (1.33)  .13 (1.30)  .12 (1.31) 
Non-Existent  -.60 (1.81)  -.83 (1.84)  -.71 (1.83) 
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Table 3. 
 
Pearson Correlations Among Moderators, Mediators, and Dependent Variables 
 
 AGod BGod MGod LGod IGod NoGod   Sm   SA  Conn Intent 
B God  .104*          
M God  .099  .555**         
L God  .189**  .728**  .666**        
I God  .277** -.211**  .055  .096       
No God  .017 -.729** -.356** -.585**  .365**      
Small Self  .099 -.032 -.019  .001  .182**  .113*     
Self-Aware  .038  .065  .050  .061  .103*  .005  .380**   
Connect -.085  .277**  .323**  .233** -.153** -.218** -.153** -.060   
Pro. Intent -.050  .251**  .185**  .147** -.103* -.136** -.153** .021  .399** 
Hours Pledged -.026  .027  .063 -.018 -.110  .055  .068 -.043  .122* .233** 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 

























Table 4.        
        
Pearson Correlations of Self-Transcendent Connection Items 
        
Scale Item 1  2 3  4  5  6  7 
1. Oneness with all        
2. One living organism .616**       
3. No limits .390** .413**      
4. Strong sense of unity .591** .578** .521**     
5. No separation .416** .466** .394** .614**    
6. Something greater .323** .232** .363** .305** .188**   
7. Greater entity .404** .333** .428** .364** .284** .669**  
8. Something grand .387** .324** .427** .398** .333** .732** .697** 
 
** Correlation is significant at p < .01; n = 374; 
Non-abbreviated items are the following: 
1. I have a clear, deep feeling of oneness with all that exists. 
2. I sometimes feel so connected to nature that everything seems to be part of one living    
organism. 
3. I feel like I am part of something with no limits or boundaries in time and space. 
4. I feel a strong sense of unity with all the things around me. 
5. I feel so connected to the people around me that it is like there is no separation between us. 
6. I feel the presence of something greater than myself. 
7. I feel part of some greater entity. 
8. I feel like I am in the presence of something grand. 
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Figure 1. Path diagram of implicit prime through small self to volunteer hours pledged. 
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Figure 2. Path diagram of implicit prime through public self-awareness to volunteer 
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Figure 3. Path diagram of implicit prime through self-transcendent connection to  
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Figure 4. Path diagram of implicit prime through simultaneous mediators to volunteer 
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Figure 5. Path diagram for the implicit prime through all simultaneous mediators to two-
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Figure 7. Path diagram for mediation of religiosity and divine belief effects on pledged 
volunteer hours by public self-awareness, small self, and self-transcendent connection. 
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Figure 8. Path diagram for mediation of the effects of religiosity and divine belief on 
two-week prosocial intentions through public self-awareness, small self, and self-
transcendent connection. Unstandardized coefficients and confidence intervals are shown.  
 
 
